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ABSTRACT
In this paper I evaluate the contribution of R&D investments to productivity growth. The basis for
the analysis are the free entry condition and the fact that most R&D innovations are embodied. Free
entry yields a relationship between the resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology.
Since innovators are small, this relationship is not directly affected by the size of R&D externalities,
or the presence of aggregate diminishing returns in R&D after controlling for the growth rate of
output and the interest rate. The embodiment of R&D-driven innovations bounds the size of the
production externalities. The resulting contribution of R&D to productivity growth in the US is
smaller than three to five tenths of one percentage point. This constitutes an upper bound for the case
where innovators internalize the consequences of their R&D investments on the cost of conducting
future innovations. From a normative perspective, this analysis implies that, if the innovation
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In this paper, I try to answer two questions: First, what has the contribution of R&D to productivity
growth been in the US during the post-war period? After providing an estimate for the R&D
contribution, I can answer the second: How does the actual R&D intensity compare to the socially
optimal intensity?
The ﬁrst question has been examined repeatedly before by computing the social return to R&D
in a simple econometric framework. Typically, the endogenous variable is the Solow residual and
the explanatory variables are the ﬁrm’s or industry’s own R&D intensity and the used R&D from
other ﬁrms or industries. The estimated return to own R&D ranges from .2 to .5, while for the
used R&D the estimate ranges from .4 to .8 with a total social return to R&D of about 70 to 100
percent.1 These numbers are very large. Indeed, since the average share of non-defense R&D in
GDP over the postwar period has been 1.6 percent, they imply that the Solow residual is fully
accounted by R&D alone.
Before accepting this conclusion, we should keep in mind one important caveat to this econo-
metric approach. Namely, that there are many factors omitted in the typical regression that aﬀect
simultaneously TFP growth and the parties incentives to invest in R&D. The most obvious candi-
dates are anything that enhances disembodied productivity, like the managerial and organizational
practices, learning by doing,... All these elements have a clear eﬀect on TFP and at the same time
induce ﬁrms to invest in R&D. Some evidence in favor of the potential importance of this bias comes
from the fact that, after including ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression, the eﬀect of R&D on TFP growth
almost disappears (Jones and Williams [1998]).
To overcome this omitted variable bias, I depart from the econometric framework. Instead, I
use a model with endogenous development of new technologies to assess the importance of R&D for
growth. From a methodological point of view, I do not attempt to calibrate directly the social return
to R&D in order to determine its role on growth. My route is more indirect since it decomposes
the problem into two parts. First, I compute the eﬀect of the amount of resources devoted to R&D
on the output of the R&D sector (that is the growth rate of R&D driven technologies). Then, I
use simple growth accounting to compute the eﬀect of the growth of technology on productivity
growth.
One possible way to establish the ﬁrst relationship ( i.e. between the resources devoted to R&D
1See Griliches [1992], Jones and Williams [1998] and Nadiri [1992] for references.
3and the growth rate of technology) consists in calibrating the production function of technology.
This approach, however, entails probably even more challenges than the traditional productivity
approach because in addition to measuring the externalities involved in R&D, we need to specify
an R&D production function. I discuss this further below in the context of a speciﬁc empirical test.
The approach I propose in this paper, instead, exploits the free entry condition into R&D and
the fact that R&D innovations are embodied. Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, R&D ﬁrms
break even. As a result, the cost of the resources devoted to R&D equals the value of the newly
developed technologies. From here, it follows that the relationship between the share of resources
devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology is a linear function of the inverse of the market
value of an innovation.
The advantage of using a free entry condition instead of the production function for innovations
is that it is very easy to compute the private vale of an innovation. Since innovators are small,
they don’t take into account the eﬀect of their investment decisions on the aggregate variables
when computing the value of an innovation. Therefore, I can redo the asset pricing calculations
conducted by individual innovators where they take as given observable aggregate variables to
calculate the private value of an innovation. Then, I can use the free entry condition to calibrate
the growth rate of new technologies for a given R&D intensity without having to take any stand on
the speciﬁcation or calibration of the production function for new technologies.
To implement this exercise, I follow most of the productivity literature by using the NSF data on
R&D. The NSF measures the resources spent towards the development of new knowledge, products
and processes by workers with training in physical sciences. It is important to understand that these
innovations aﬀect the production of ﬁnal output mostly through the development of new goods.2 In
that sense, the innovations that result from the R&D activities, as measured by the NSF, represent
by and large innovations that are embodied in the sense of Solow [1959]. This means that a ﬁrm
can only beneﬁt from R&D by using the goods that result from the R&D activities.3,4
2Process innovations can be thought as resulting in the development of new goods that replace the old ones. The
model used in the next section to calibrate the R&D contribution to productivity growth naturally accomodates this
mechanism.
3Of course, R&D labs could beneﬁt from the knowledge created in previous R&D eﬀorts. These R&D externalities
are addressed below. I will not consider, however, the possibility that ﬁnal output ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o mt h ek n o w l e d g e
created in the labs without using the goods that embody it.
4Clearly, there are other (non-R&D) intentional investments that lead to improvements in productivity. These
investments are mostly disembodied in the sense that, to enjoy the gains in productivity, ﬁrms do not need to adopt
any new capital or intermediate good. A few examples in this category are: the resources Henry Ford devoted to
4The results I obtain are quite striking given the existing consensus about the importance of
R&D for growth.5 The average annual growth rate of productivity in the US during the post-war
period has been 2.2 percentage points. Less than 3 to 5 tenths of 1 percentage point are due to
R&D.
The intuition for this small contribution is quite simple. The few resources devoted to R&D
signal a small private value of the innovations. But, as the bulk of the productivity literature has
argued, there may be signiﬁcant externalities that lead to large productivity gains even with few
R&D investments. These externalities can appear in the production of ﬁnal output or in the R&D
process.
Production externalities arise because the development of one innovation has an eﬀect on labor
productivity beyond its contribution to the capital stock (i.e. it aﬀects the Solow residual). When
innovations are embodied, ﬁrms enjoy production externalities to the extent that they use the
new goods. Further, a larger production externality implies that, for a given number of available
innovations, the demand faced by new innovators is higher. Therefore, ceteris paribus,t h em a r k e t
value of an innovation is positively correlated with its social value. In terms of my two-step approach,
this means that a larger production externality raises the eﬀect of the growth of technology on
productivity growth but reduces the growth of technology associated with a given R&D intensity.
As a result, the R&D contribution to productivity growth is not very sensitive to the size of the
externalities in production.
R&D externalities associate past R&D investments with a reduction in the cost of developing
future innovations. To show the inconsistency of large R&D externalities and a low R&D intensity
in steady state, suppose for a moment that the R&D externalities were large and that the economy is
in steady state. Then, a small R&D intensity today, can generate a large growth rate of technology
that in turn generates a large reduction in the costs of developing innovations tomorrow. As a result,
tomorrow, agents want to devote a large share of resources into R&D; but this is inconsistent with
the fact that the share of resources devoted to R&D is constant in steady state. Therefore, the
observed low R&D intensity indicates that R&D externalities cannot be very large.
The free entry condition establishes a relationship between the R&D intensity and the growth
improve the mass production system, McKinsey’s reports, the resources devoted to develop better personnel and
accounting practices, or any other managerial innovation.
5The only exception to this consensus is the BLS who reports a R&D contribution to Total Factor Productivity
growth of 0.2 percentage points. This diﬀerence steams from the rate of return for R&D that the BLS imputes which
is substantially lower than in the rest of the literature.
5rate of technology that can be used to calibrate the size of the R&D externalities. Once this is done,
we can solve the social planner’s problem. This entails determining how much she would invest in
R&D with the calibrated production structure. Then we can compare this socially optimal R&D
intensity with the actual intensity in order to answer the second question posed in this paper.
Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that the observed R&D intensity may be quite close to the socially optimal
intensity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the baseline calibration One
clear goal of this paper is to show that the magnitude of the calibrated R&D contribution to pro-
ductivity growth is very robust. Section 3 tries to show this by considering more general production
functions that accommodate more ﬂexible relationships between R&D-driven technology and pro-
ductivity growth. This analysis emphasizes the importance that R&D innovations are embodied.
In this sense, this paper contributes to the literature started with Phelps [1962] on the relevance of
the decomposition between embodied and disembodied technological progress. In section 3.1, I in-
vestigate some elements that aﬀect the relationship between the share of resources devoted to R&D
and the growth rate of technology (for example the presence of increasing returns in the production
of R&D driven technologies, international spillovers, ...). In section 3.3, I move out of the steady
state and consider how the calibrations would change had the US economy been in transition to
the steady state. In section 4, I discuss the limits of the approach proposed in this paper. Section
5 draws the welfare implications of the previous analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic argument
Throughout the paper I use ˙ X to designate the time derivative of a generic variable X,a n dγX
to denote the growth rate of variable X. Let’s denote by A the level of technology associated with
R&D investments. In the terminology of Romer [1990] or Grossman and Helpman [1991, ch. 3],
this is the number of varieties though I will show later that this framework can accommodate other
interpretations. To compute the R&D contribution to productivity growth, I start by investigating
the relationship between the amount of resources devoted to R&D (expressed in units of ﬁnal output,
which is the numeraire), R, and the growth rate of technology. Then I use a production function
to relate the growth rate of A to the growth rate of labor productivity.
Let PA denote the market price of a ﬁrm that has earned a patent to produce one of these
varieties. The free entry condition implies that innovators make zero proﬁts in equilibrium, there-
6fore the cost incurred to develop the patent (R) is equal to the market value of the ﬂow of new
technologies (PA ˙ A).6
PA ˙ A = R (Free Entry)






where Y denotes the economy-wide output, s denotes the share of resources devoted to R&D (i.e.
s ≡ R
Y ). To establish the link between R&D intensity (s)a n dt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fR & D - d r i v e n
technologies (γA) we just need to ﬁnd an expression for Y
PAA. For that it is necessary to specify a
production function and to price the stock of patents.
Final output (Yt) is produced out of labor (Lt) and intermediate goods (xit). In particular, I













where Zt denotes the level of non-R&D-driven technology.7















where pit denotes the price of the ith variety.
To produce one unit of intermediate goods producers need to use a unit of capital whose rental
price is r.8 Innovators can charge a markup (η) above the marginal cost of production either because
they earn a patent or because they keep secret the blueprint of the innovation. Optimal pricing
of the intermediate goods that embody the innovations implies that the markup is constant and
6For the argument to go through, we just need this relationship to hold in the long-run because our interest is on
the determinants of long-run productivity growth.
7This speciﬁcation introduces a wedge between the capital share (α) and the elasticity of substitution across
diﬀerent varieties which is equal to αρ.
8The calibrated eﬀect of R&D on growth is independent of the rate of transformation between ﬁnal output and
intermediate goods. This parameter that here is normalized to 1 just cancels out.
7equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent intermediate goods (i.e.
η =( αρ)−1).
















To close the ﬁrst step in the argument, we just have to derive the market price of an innovation.
Suppose for simplicity that patents do not expire and that innovators are not overtaken by new
innovators with more sophisticated capital goods. Then the value of an innovation, PA, must satisfy
the following asset equation:
rPA = π + ˙ PA, (5)
where r is the relevant discount rate.





In steady state, all variables grow at constant rates. From equation (1), this implies that
γPA = γY − γA. (7)
Substituting expressions (4), (6) and (7) into equation (1) and isolating γA we obtain the fol-








There are two important observations from this expression. First, the link between γA and s
does not come from a production function for technology; it follows from the positive relationship
that the free entry condition (1) deﬁnes between the two. Second, γA in expression (8) does not
depend directly on the size of the externalities in R&D or on the degree of the diminishing returns
to aggregate R&D investments;9 note that I have not even speciﬁed the production function for the
9In section 4.1.4 I generalize the analysis to allow for dynamic increasing returns in R&D at the ﬁrm level by
conceding incumbents a cost advantage in subsequent R&D.
8creation of technologies. This is the case because we have mimicked the calculations made by small
innovators that want to ﬁgure out the market price of their innovations (PA) and do not take into
account the eﬀect of their investment decisions on aggregate variables like the interest rate or the
growth rate of output. Since the externalities appear through these aggregate variables, we do not
need to calibrate them once we control for γY and r.
The second step in the computation of the R&D contribution to productivity growth consists
in using the production function (2) to relate the growth rate of R&D driven technology (γA)t o
the growth rate of productivity. From there it follows that
γY/L ≡ γY − γL = γZ +
1
ρ
γA + α(γx − γL)( 9 )
To solve for γx, I take advantage of the symmetry of the intermediate goods in production. From











In steady state r is constant and therefore γx − γL =
1−ρ
ρ(1−α)γA. Plugging this back into (??), we














Using the expression for the optimal markup and (8) we can rewrite the contribution of R&D
to productivity growth as follows:
Contribution of R&D to productivity growth =
α
1 − α
r − γY £
η−1 α
s − (η − 1)−1¤
2.1 Calibration
To assess the role of R&D in productivity growth we must calibrate ﬁve parameters: r, γY, α,s
and η.
s is calibrated using data from the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF estimates
the expenditures from four surveys (Research and Development in Industry, Academic Research
and Development Expenditures, Federal Funds for Research and Development, and Survey of R&D
Funding & Performance by Nonproﬁt Organizations). Funds used for R&D refer to current operating
9costs. These costs consist on both direct and indirect costs. They include not only salaries, but also
fringe beneﬁts, materials, supplies, and overhead. The R&D costs also include the depreciation of
the capital stock employed in R&D activities.
To the extent that these surveys encompass only existing institutions, they will be ignoring
current R&D investments conducted by starting ﬁrms. For example, the NSF statistics ignore Bill
Gates’ time spent tinkering in his garage. The omission of these expenditures is probably not very
relevant from a quantitative point of view. This claim follows from the fact that in 1999 only 4
percent of total industrial R&D came from ﬁr m sw i t hl e s st h a n2 5e m p l o y e e s . T h i sn u m b e ri s
an upper bound for the average share of R&D from small ﬁrms for the post-War period since in
1998 it was only 3 percent and in 1997, the share of industrial R&D from small ﬁrms was only 2
percent. Since most start ups become small incorporated ﬁrms and continue doing R&D (surely
more intensively than before incorporation), these small fractions should give us an idea of the small
magnitude of the bias.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the share of US non-defense R&D expenditures in the US GDP as
reported by the NSF. The average over the post-War period is about 1.6 percent. In my calibrations,
Iu s eav a l u ef o rs of 0.02, which is an upper bound for the average share of resources devoted to




























Figure 1: US share of non-defense R&D expenditures in GDP in percentage points. Source: NSF.
r is calibrated to the average real stock return in the US post-War period from Mehra and
Prescott [1985]. Pakes and Schankerman [1984] provide evidence that this is approximately the
private rate of return to R&D once we take into account the obsolescence of patents and the
gestation lags that I incorporate in the next section. The average real growth rate of output (γY)
10between 1950 and 1999 in the US reported by the BLS is 0.034. α is calibrated to 1/3 to match
the capital share in the post-war period. For the markup (η) I explore two values: 1.2 and 1.5. The
latter is on the upper limit of the intervals given by Basu [1996] and Norrbin [1993] for the average
markup in the economy. However, I regard this as more realistic since the markups charged by
innovators should be well above the average markup in the economy because of the monopolistic
power conferred by the patent system and because the higher ratio of the up front ﬁxed cost to the
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Figure 2: R&D contribution to productivity growth in the baseline model.
Figure 2 displays the R&D contribution to productivity growth for various levels of R&D in-
tensity and for the two values of the markup. The ﬁrst thing that stands out from this ﬁgure is
that for R&D intensities similar to the observed in the US post-war period (i.e. around 2 percent),
10Results hold a fortiori if η is calibrated to a higher value.
11the R&D contribution to productivity represents only about a tenth of the average annual growth
rate of productivity in the post-war period (2.2 percent). For the higher markup (η =1 .5) even an
R&D intensity three times larger than the observed in the US (6 percent) only would account for
half of the growth rate of productivity observed in the post-war period. For the low (less realistic)
markup (η =1 .2), an R&D intensity of 4 percent is necessary to account for half of the post-war
productivity growth rate. To account for all the post-war productivity growth the required R&D
intensities are 4.8 percent for the low markup case and 8 percent for the high markup.
In other calibrations not reported here, I have observed that the small R&D contribution to
productivity growth is very robust to the parameterization of the interest rate (r). This allows me
to extend the results to environments where the opportunity cost of R&D investments is higher
because innovators are credit constrained or more risk averse.
The small contribution of R&D is the result of three eﬀects. First, the low R&D intensity ob-
served in steady state implies that the externalities in the R&D process are small. Otherwise, future
R&D investments would be very proﬁtable and we should observe a large R&D intensity. Second,
the small R&D intensity also implies that the growth rate of A f o ra n yg i v e nm a r k u p( w i t h i nr e a -
sonable bounds) must be relatively low. Finally, in this environment where R&D innovations aﬀect
productivity through the goods that embody them, the contribution of production externalities to
productivity growth is equal to (1
ρ − α)γA. For given α and γA, a lower elasticity of substitution
across the diﬀerent intermediate goods increases the size of the production externalities. However,
a reduction in the elasticity of substitution also raises the markup (η). Naturally, this results in a
higher PA and, from the free entry condition, in a lower γA for any given R&D intensity (s). In
other words, as I will emphasize in section 3.2, the embodiment assumption introduces a trade oﬀ
between the growth rate of R&D-driven technology and the size of the production externalities that
bounds the R&D contribution to productivity.
3 Extensions
Now, I extend the baseline model along several dimensions to show that the size of the R&D
contribution to productivity growth is robust. The ﬁrst group of extensions deals with considerations
that aﬀect the private value of an innovation. These include the obsolescence of innovations, the
presence of international spillovers in R&D investments, R&D lags, the imitation of innovations, and
the possibility of successive R&D for incumbent ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrm-level increasing returns to R&D).
12The second extension generalizes the production function to capture more general externalities in
the production of ﬁnal output. Finally, I relax the assumption that the economy is in steady state
and compute the R&D contribution to productivity growth if the US economy had been in transition
during the post-war period.
3.1 The value of innovations
In the free entry condition, equation (1), we can see that the relationship between the share of
resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology is mediated by the value of innovations.
Therefore, in principle, the R&D contribution to growth could be increased by enriching the model
with new dimensions of the R&D process that aﬀect the value of innovations. Next, I show that
the small contribution is robust to many variations.
3.1.1 Creative destruction
To incorporate the ﬁrm dynamics that characterize the Schumpeterian models of Aghion and Howitt
[1992] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4] I follow Jones and Williams [2000]. They
introduce the concept of innovation clusters to capture the idea that innovations come in bunches
and that ﬁrms must adopt all of the innovations in a cluster to actually beneﬁtf r o mi t .S a y ,o u t
of every (ψN + ψ) intermediate goods developed, only ψN are completely new. The rest are just
new versions of existing intermediate goods that are necessary to use the new intermediate good.
These new versions are otherwise identical to the existing ones.11 When a new cluster is adopted,
the new versions of existing intermediate goods replace the old versions and this limits the expected
life-time of an innovation.
When a new technological cluster is developed, the incumbents may try to prevent the diﬀusion
of the new technological cluster by reducing their prices. This introduces some richer interactions in
the pricing of intermediate goods. In particular, two scenarios are possible. It may be the case that
these reactions do not constrain the pricing decisions of the innovators. Then the innovator charges
the monopolist price, p = r/(αρ). Alternatively, the limit pricing rule may be binding. Since in
reality we observe that new products are developed and adopted I focus on the equilibrium where
11A simple example that illustrates this concept is a CD writer. Before the CD writer was developed, we just had
a CD reader and a software for this to work. Now with the CD writer, we must modify the CD reader’s software
to make possible the interaction between the two drives. In this case, ψ =1( t h es o f t w a r e )a n dψN =1( t h eC D
writer).
13new intermediate goods are immediately adopted.12 After imposing this restriction we can derive
the limit pricing rule that is consistent with the adoption of new varieties. Jones and Williams










Intuitively, the higher the ratio of the number of new goods to the number of complementary goods
that must be changed to use the new innovation (
ψN
ψ ), the lower is the limit markup because more
incumbents are willing to reduce their prices to prevent adoption. Quite naturally, the limit price
is also decreasing in the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. The resulting price for
intermediate goods is pit = ηrt where
η =m i n

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˙ A = R. (11)













From here it follows that
γA =










and that the R&D contribution of to productivity growth is








12If this is not the case, there is no reason to undertake R&D investments.
14I do not attempt to calibrate
ψ
ψN.13 As in the baseline model, ρ is calibrated by exploiting its
relationship with the markup. Now there are two cases depending on whether the innovator can
charge the monopolistic markup or whether she is forced to use the limit pricing rule.
Case 1: If η = 1
αρ then 1
ρ = ηα. Figure 3 plots the contribution of R&D to productivity growth
for diﬀerent values of η and
ψ
ψN for an R&D intensity of 2 percent. In the ﬁgure we can see that
under monopolistic pricing the contribution of R&D to growth is bounded above by two tenths
of one percentage point. That is, R&D cannot account for more than one tenth of the postwar
productivity growth under monopolistic pricing of the innovations.

















Figure 3: Contribution of R&D to productivity growth, monopolistic pricing.


























13This could be done by using data on the average life span of a patent or, when more sophisticated concepts of
ﬁrms are introduced, on the average life span of a ﬁrm or on the average number of patents held by an innovator.














Figure 4 plots the relationship between ρ and ψ/ψN implied by the limit pricing rule for several
values of η. Figure 5 plots the contribution of R&D to productivity growth as a function of ψ/ψN
under limit pricing for diﬀerent markups for an R&D intensity of 2 percent. In this case, the upper
bound of the contribution of R&D to productivity growth is one tenth of a percentage point.



















Figure 5: R&D contribution to productivity growth under limit pricing.
An interesting observation that arises at this point, is that the eﬀect of ψ/ψN on the R&D
contribution to productivity growth depends on the pricing rule. Under monopolistic pricing, the
16R&D contribution to productivity is decreasing in the ratio
ψ
ψN because the value of an innovation
(PA) increases with the ratio14 and, from free entry, this reduces the growth rate of A consistent
with the observed R&D intensity. When innovations’ prices are limited by the prices of the previous
innovations, the contribution is increasing in ψ/ψN because, in addition to the previous eﬀect, now
ρ decreases in ψ/ψN, for any given markup, as illustrated in ﬁgure 4. As we have just argued, the
size of the production externalities decreases with the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and
therefore it increases in the ratio ψ/ψN.T h i se ﬀect dominates the eﬀect on PA and, as a result, the
R&D contribution to productivity increases with ψ/ψN.
3.1.2 Correlated shocks
In the baseline model we have assumed that the obsolescence shocks are independent across the
diﬀerent intermediate goods in a common innovation cluster. This is probably not a very realistic
assumption. When a new technological cluster is developed, there is a chance that it drives out of
the market a large number of intermediate goods of an older cluster. In this scenario, the shocks
faced by the intermediate goods in a given cluster are highly correlated. In Comin [2002] I model
this idea in the simple case where each new technological cluster makes completely obsolete an older
cluster. This is precisely the structure of the simple quality ladder models. It turns out from my
analysis that even after introducing correlated shocks and R&D lags, the contribution of R&D to
productivity growth for the more reasonable markups is bounded above by 3 to 5 tenths of one
percentage point.
3.1.3 Imitation
Another relevant extension consists in relaxing the assumption of perfect enforcement of patents.
If imitators are able to copy the goods developed by the innovators, the value of innovations de-
clines and the free entry condition yields a higher growth rate of A for any given R&D intensity.
Nevertheless, imitation does not aﬀect substantially the R&D contributions to productivity growth
computed above. Mansﬁeld el al. [1981] have information about the probability that an innovation
is imitated and about the average cost of imitation. If in addition we recognize that imitations
14This follows because an innovator that has succeeded in developing a new technological cluster collects revenues
from ψ+ψN goods. At the same time, the probability that future researchers erode his rents in any of these goods is
increasing in
ψ
ψN . As in Schumpeterian growth models, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates because it comes ﬁrst in time and,
as a result, PA increases with
ψ
ψN .
17are not more valuable than the original innovations, then we can easily redo our calculations and
observe that the R&D contribution to productivity growth is bounded above by 3 to 5 tenths of
one percentage points.15
3.1.4 Subsequent R&D cost advantage
Up to now, a ﬁrm has been characterized by the set of varieties that form an innovation cluster.
All of these intermediate goods are developed simultaneously and once they become obsolete the
ﬁrm vanishes. However, the evidence tells us that a large fraction of innovations are developed by
ﬁrms that have already developed some other innovation clusters. This can be due to the fact that
the costs of innovation decline with the number of varieties developed (i.e. there is some form of
increasing returns to R&D at the ﬁrm level). If this is the case, innovations are more valuable than
what we have computed so far. Investing in R&D not only grants the right to future revenues from
the new innovation cluster but also the option to develop more clusters in the future at a lower cost.
To reconcile the higher value of innovations with the observed low s, the free entry condition now
dictates a lower growth rate of varieties and a smaller contribution of R&D to productivity growth.
This additional complexity is useful to generalize the argument made above to large ﬁrms. These
internalize part of the positive consequences of their investment decisions. By taking advantage of
part of the externalities, the value of the R&D ﬁrm increases, and the growth rate of varieties
induced by a given share of R&D is lower than when ﬁrms are small. Hence, the benchmark
contribution computed above gives an upper bound for the role of R&D in productivity growth
when ﬁrms are allowed to grow. The appendix shows this statements formally.
3.1.5 R&D lags
In reality there is a lag between the outlay of the R&D investment and the beginning of the
associated revenue stream. This lag corresponds both to the lag between project inception and
conception (the gestation lag), and the time from project completion to commercial application (the
application lag). Rapoport [1971] and Wagner [1968] have gathered data on lags for 52 technologies
in various manufacturing sectors and have found that these lags range between 1.5 and 2.5 years.
15Probably, this upper bound overstates the contribution of R&D because some of the imitation expenses are likely
to be reported as research and development expenses in the NSF surveys. This would have the eﬀect of reducing
s in our calculations, and from the free entry condition, would result in a lower γA and in a lower contribution to
productivity growth.
18In Comin [2002] I show that introducing these lags in the analysis has a very small eﬀect on the
previous calculations.
3.1.6 International technology ﬂows
Intermediate goods ﬂow internationally. The new technologies developed in Japan can be purchased
in the US and used in the production of ﬁnal output. This observation has two implications for
the baseline analysis. On the one hand, I should use the R&D investments conducted in the whole
world, and not just in the US, to calibrate the R&D intensity. On the other, a US innovator now
can sell her innovation to the whole world, and therefore I should take into consideration the eﬀect
of this larger market size on the value of innovations. In terms of our calibration, the ﬁrst eﬀect




˙ A = Rw, (14)








where Yw and sw denote respectively the world level of output and the share of R&D in the world’s
output.
The second eﬀect implies that the proﬁts of a successful innovator are a function of the output
of the countries where she can sell her innovations. Since innovations can be sold internationally,


















The last term on the right hand side is the same as in the closed economy case. In steady state,
equation (15) implies that γPAw is equal to γYw − γA. But the interesting action takes place in
the proﬁtr a t e . T h e r ew ec a ns e et h a tt h et w oc o n s e q u ences from the internationalization of the











Intuitively, the international ﬂow of intermediate goods raises the resources devoted to develop
the varieties that are ultimately used in the production of US output. The ﬂip side of the coin is
that US’ (and any other country’s) innovators can sell their goods to a larger market. Since both
forces are proportional to Yw, they cancel out.16
Plugging this expression into the asset equation (16), we obtain the following growth rate of
innovations:
γA =










It is easy to see that the ﬁgures obtained cannot be larger than the ones obtained in the previous
section. Note from expression (17) that γA is increasing in sw and decreasing in γYw.I nt h ep o s t -
War period, the growth rate of output in the OECD has been higher than in the US, and the share
of R&D in GDP is higher in the US than in the OECD. Therefore, the upper bounds for the R&D
contribution to productivity growth are unaﬀected by introducing international considerations.
S i n c ew eh a v en o ts p e c i ﬁed a production function for new technologies, this conclusion holds for
production functions that capture all sorts of international spillovers in R&D.
3.2 More general production functions17




ρ(1−α) , where the ﬁrst term corresponds to the static externality of A on output and the second to
the capital deepening driven by the development of new technologies. One might argue that with
a more general production function we could parameterize the externality in production in such
16This is not the case if international partners engage in R&D but the US innovators cannot export their products.
This scenario, however, seems empirically irrelevant.
17In this analysis I have assumed that the production function of ﬁnal output is Cobb-Douglas. Basu [1997],
Burnside, Eichembaum and Rebelo [1995] and Berndt [1976] among others have shown that a Cobb-Douglas is a
good approximation to the US data. Further, in the working paper version of this article (Comin[2002]) I show that
the growth rate of R&D innovations is not very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.












In this production function, by increasing σ we can increase the size of the production externality
and the R&D contribution to growth. However, note also that in this production function R&D
innovations are not embodied. Firms do not need to buy a single unit of the latest innovation to
beneﬁt from the productivity gains associated with this innovation. But this is not consistent with
the NSF deﬁnition of R&D.
In what follows, I show that if R&D technologies are embodied the R&D contribution to pro-
ductivity does not depend very much on the size of the production externalities. Intuitively, the
variable production externality introduces a wedge between the eﬀective level of R&D-driven tech-
nology and A. The embodied nature of R&D innovations implies that to beneﬁtf r o mt h e m ,ﬁrms
must purchase the goods that embody these innovations. If the elasticity of the eﬀective level of
R&D technology with respect to A is larger than one, the eﬃciency of an innovation grows with its
vintage. Moreover, a larger production externality generates a higher eﬀective level of technology
embodied in a new good, for a given A, and this, in turn, induces a larger demand and a higher
value for the innovations. Hence, when R&D innovations are embodied, the free entry condition
implies that a higher production externality reduces the growth rate of A associated with a given
R&D intensity. This eﬀect introduces a trade oﬀ that limits how much productivity growth can be
explained by increasing the size of the production externalities.
To see this more formally, consider an environment that is exactly the same as in the baseline











where now the level of R&D-driven technology is a continuous variable and the capital varieties
have diﬀerent eﬃciencies ai. To introduce some ﬂexibility on the size of the production externality,
Is e tai = biσ−1, where b is any positive constant that, without loss of generality, I normalize to 1,
σ > αρ and i is a technology index. The size of the externality in production is increasing in σ.
When σ > 1, newer innovations are more eﬃcient than older innovations.













Due to the isoelastic nature of the demand, innovators set a price equal to a constant markup
η times the marginal cost of production r. Following the same algebraic steps as in the standard
model, we can easily ﬁnd that when the state of the art technology has index A, the level of output
is given by expression (18) and the proﬁts for an innovator that developed a variety with index



























In this last expression, we can distinguish two eﬀects of σ on the proﬁts of an innovator. The
higher curvature in the eﬃciency of capital vintages (σ), the higher the initial level of proﬁts, but
also the faster ﬁnal good producers gradually substitute towards the new, more eﬃcient, varieties.
Expression (19) can be rewritten in terms of the vintage of the variety sold by the innovator.
More speciﬁcally, let vi be the vintage of the ith variety. In steady state, A grows at the constant
rate γA. Let’s suppose that the economy started on the balanced growth path. Then the proﬁts at













When σ > 1, the innovations embodied in newer varieties are more proﬁtable than those embodied
in older vintages. The converse is true when σ < 1. Consequently, the market value of an innovation
generically varies in the cross-section. Let PAt,v denote the price at time t of a vintage v innovation.
From free entry, we know that
PAtt =
sψN













where χK is a positive constant; and that
Y = χY ZA˜ σKαL1−α,
where χY is another positive constant and ˜ σ =
σ(1−αρ)
ρ .
22Since PAtv is determined in the market, it satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation:




It is easy to see that PAtv = PAtt e
−γA(
σ−1






Dividing both sides of equation (22) by PAvt and plugging (20) and this expression for γPAtv, we
can derive expression (23).
γA =



















This expression diﬀers from the growth rate of technology in the baseline model (??)i nt w o
respects. First, the proﬁt rate of innovations increases with σ. Second, a higher σ implies a higher
expected capital loss due to the depreciation of the market value of the innovations. The ﬁrst eﬀect
raises the current value of an innovation while the second reduces it. However, in expression (23)
it is clear that the ﬁrst force dominates the second, and the higher is the externality in production
(σ) the lower is the growth rate of technology associated with a given R&D intensity.









Note that, for a given γA, the R&D contribution to productivity growth is increasing in σ. However,
doing some simple algebra we can check that, after taking into account the eﬀect of σ on γA, the
R&D contribution to productivity growth is decreasing in σ. To assess the quantitative importance
of these eﬀects, I plot in ﬁgure 6 the R&D contribution for several values of σ and ψ/ψN when the
markup is equal to 1.2 and the R&D intensity is 2 percent.20 For conciseness, I restrict myself to
the case of monopolistic markups (i.e. η =( αρ)
−1).
19For this one can solve the diﬀerential equation (22) plugging in (20) and using the initial condition (21).
20For higher values of the markups the contribution is smaller.



















Figure 6: R&D contribution to productivity growth with η =1 .2,s=0 .02, for several σ0s
From this ﬁgure, we can see that, if R&D innovations are embodied, the R&D contribution to
productivity growth is quite robust to the size of the production externality and it is smaller than
two tenths of one percentage point.
This result relates this paper to a literature that has studied the relevance of the distinction
between embodied and disembodied productivity growth. The interest in this question started with
Phelps [1962] who showed that the elasticity of the steady state level of output with respect to
the savings rate does not depend on the composition of technological progress.21 On the empirical
front, Denison [1964] argued that embodied technological change represents a small fraction of
productivity growth. Twenty years later, Mc Hugh and Lane [1987] came out with better estimates
that controlled for the cyclical variation in the utilization of capital of diﬀerent vintages and showed
that the contribution of the embodied component of productivity growth was substantial. The
argument presented in this section has brought the embodiment hypothesis to the core of the
analysis. In line with the replies to Phelps [1962], it has show that the fact that R&D innovations
are embodied in new goods is very relevant to calibrate the contribution to labor productivity of
R&D investments.
21For the debate that followed see also Matthews [1964], Phelps and Yaari [1964], Levhari and Sheshinski [1967]
and Fisher, Levhari and Sheshinski [1969].
243.3 Transition
Jones [2001] has argued that the US economy has be e ni nat r a n s i t i o nt ot h es t e a d ys t a t ed u r i n g
the post-war period. In this section I study what the previous analysis implies if the US economy
is in transition.
When deriving the relationship between s and γA, I have assumed that the economy is in steady












γY − γA +
Transition z }| {
γs − γγA.
The asset pricing equation holds at every instant, but now we have to recognize the new expression















γA = −(r − γY − γs)( 2 4 )
Since s is time varying this diﬀerential equation does not have a closed form solution. To approx-
i m a t et h ea v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t eo fA, we can solve this diﬀerential equation calibrating s to the






















For illustrative purposes, suppose that the term (r(v) − γY(v) − γs(v)) is constant. Then this



















In the long run (r − γY − γs) > 0, therefore for a steady state to exist, it is necessary that
˜ C =0 . This implies that
γA =










25In ﬁgure 1, we can observe an upward trend in s for the post-war period. This positive growth
in s, yields a lower γA in expression (25) and a lower R&D contribution than if s had remained
constant. Intuitively, a (temporary) upward trend in the share of resources devoted to R&D is
due to an expected appreciation in the value of innovations. Therefore the current market price
of innovations is higher and, from free entry, the associated growth rate of R&D driven-technology
must be lower.
4 Discussion
So far, I have argued that by exploiting the free entry condition we can assess the importance of
R&D for productivity growth. Speciﬁcally, if the markups charged by the innovators are large, if
innovations are embodied in new intermediate goods and if the equilibrium R&D intensity is small
the contribution of R&D to productivity growth is quite small (i.e. about one tenth of the observed
growth rate).
The analysis in section 3.2 has illustrated how the embodiment of innovations is an important
element in this argument because it limits the size of the production externalities. This assumption
seems very plausible in the light of what the NSF deﬁn e sa sR & D . 22 According to the NSF, “R&D
consists on activities carried on by persons trained, either formally or by experience, in the physical
sciences such as chemistry and physics, the biological sciences such as medicine, and engineering
and computer science. R&D includes these activities if the purpose is to do one or more of the
following things:
1. Pursue a planned search for new knowledge [...]. (Basic research)
2. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the creation of a new product or process
[...]. (Applied research)
3. Apply existing knowledge to problems involved in the improvement of a present product or
process. (Development).”
From this deﬁnition, it follows that the ﬁnal product of the R&D investments are new ﬁnal,
intermediate or capital goods and the eﬀect of R&D on productivity is embodied in these new goods
in the sense of Solow [1959].
The NSF also presents a list of activities that must be excluded from the deﬁnition of R&D.
Among these we ﬁnd social science expenditures, deﬁned as those “devoted to further understand-
22In addition more than 75 percent of R&D is localized in the manufacturing sectors according to the NSF.
26ing [of] the behavior of groups of human beings or of individuals as members of groups [in the
following areas]: personnel, economics, artiﬁcial intelligence and expert systems, consumer, market
and opinion, engineering psychology, management and organization, actuarial and demographic...”.
These intentional non-R&D innovations also may lead to substantial improvements in produc-
tivity but are left out of this paper’s analysis.23 One fundamental diﬀerence with the NSF notion of
R&D is that these innovations are disembodied in the sense that, to enjoy the gains in productivity,
ﬁrms do not need to adopt any new capital or intermediate good. This distinction is substantive
because the degree of embodiment aﬀects the speciﬁc mechanisms that prevent the imitation of the
innovation and also the size of the externalities in production.
The validity of a calibration exercise always depends on how sensible the assumptions that
underlay the model are. In addition to the assumptions just stated, there are other, more standard
that also condition the analysis.24 In particular, throughout I have assumed that agents are rational
and forward-looking in the evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts from R&D. Though I personally
believe in this assumption, it may be argued that managers are myopic agents that engage in
R&D activities as a form of entry deterrence. In that case, the private value of R&D may not be
accurately captured by the asset equation I use and the whole approach may be compromised. Note
however, that the fact that managers assign an extra value to R&D because of strategic motives
should in principle enhance the private value of innovations and from the free-entry condition the
R&D contribution to productivity growth should, ceteris paribus, be even smaller than ﬁgures given
in this paper.
Having said that, I do regard the approach proposed here as a complement (rather than a
substitute) to the more traditional econometric approach. Of course, the econometric approach
encounters its own problems. In particular it is hard to overcome biases that arise from omitting
relevant variables in the regression such as determinants or measures of disembodied productivity
m a yv a r yo v e rt i m ea n da c r o s sﬁrms.
In a recent paper, Jones [2002] also analyzes the sources of growth in the US post-war experience
by posing a production function for new technologies that he estimates to determine how much
growth can be attributed to R&D. As Jones points out, the estimation of the production function
for new technologies creates as many diﬃc u l t i e sa st h er e g r e s s i o n si nt he productivity literature.
23Another mechanism that has been related to long-run growth and that is left out of this analysis is learning-by-
doing. This however is not usually thought of as an intentional investment.
24In general, by imposing the free entry condition, I have to minimize the number of assumptions. For example, I
have restricted the analysis at all with respect to the heterogenity of ﬁrms costs when conducting R&D.
27In particular, the estimate of the elasticity of TFP growth with respect to R&D investments is
likely to be biased for at least two reasons. First, business cycle ﬂuctuations in R&D expenditures
imply that the regressor is endogenous. Second, the measurement error in A (and the potential
misspeciﬁcation of the R&D production equation) also generate a correlation between the error
term and the regressor. However, Jones appeals to the possible cointegration between log(R&D)
and log(TFP) which imply that the OLS estimate of the elasticity is superconsistent (Hamilton
[1994]).25
An important practical issue is whether this asymptotic result can be invoked in a ﬁnite sample
application like Jones’s. Campbell and Perron [1991] study this question using Monte Carlo analysis
and conclude that a useful rule of thumb is that asymptotic results can be exploited in samples of
the size encountered in empirical applications when we can reject the null of no cointegration using
the asymptotic critical values. Using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, I show in Comin [2002] that
we cannot reject the null that there is no cointegration between log(R&D) and log(TFP). While
this statistical tests does not altogether rule out the possibility that R&D and TFP share a common
trend, they do suggest that it may be diﬃcult to exploit the asymptotic properties of cointegration
systems in samples of the size we currently have in order to calibrate elasticity of TFP with respect
to R&D, and that exploring alternative approaches may be useful. This paper has presented one
such alternative which implies a value of this elasticity than the typical calibration in Jones [2002].
5W e l f a r e
So far I have conducted a positive analysis of the contribution of R&D to productivity growth.
However, the previous ﬁndings can be used to conduct a normative analysis. In particular, we can
proceed in the following three steps. First, specify a production function for innovations; second,
use the computed growth rate of R&D-driven technology (γA) to quantify the size of externalities
in the production of new technologies. Finally, solve the social planner’s problem and determine
the socially optimal R&D intensity (s∗).
Note that in contrast to the positive analysis, now it is necessary to specify a production function
for new technologies, therefore our results will depend on the particular functional form speciﬁed.
In this sense, this section just intends to compare our approach to previous ones. To this end, we
25Speciﬁcally, the measure of R&D used by Jones [2002] and Comin [2002] is the number of workers in the R&D
sector.
28adopt the R&D technology used by Jones and Williams [2000] which generalizes the innovation
technology posed in Stokey [1995]. Speciﬁcally, they assume that















Expression (27) relates the size of the R&D externalities to the actual growth rate of the US
economy and to the growth rate of R&D-driven technology that I have already quantiﬁed in section
3.1.
Following Jones and Williams [2000], I consider a production function for ﬁnal output that
displays static externalities. As in section 3.2, I relate the size of this externality to the elasticity of
substitution across diﬀerent varieties and to the importance of embodied productivity growth. In








From section 3.2, we know that, in this context, the growth rate of R&D technology (γA)i s
given by expression (29) where σ ≡ ρ˜ σ/(1 − αρ).
γA =



















Expressions (27) and (29) deﬁne a relationship between λ and φ for given (η, α,s ,r ,γY, ψ/ψN,











There are a few remarks worth making about this calibration. First, note that the markup η is
calibrated conservatively, and that I impose monopolistic pricing of the innovations in order to cali-
brate the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent varieties. Finally, note that in each technological
cluster there are four times as many completely new goods as new versions of old goods.
Figure 7 plots the size of the R&D externality (φ) associated with various levels of the static
externality (σ)a n dw i t ht h es i z eo ft h es t e p p i n go nt h et o e se ﬀect (1−λ). This relationship is quite
robust to the variation of the rest of the parameter sa n di nt h i sb e n c h m a r kIh a v ec h o s e nv a l u e so f
η, ρ, ψ/ψN and θ that yield a higher schedule for φ.




















Figure 7: φ(1 − λ)
Now that we have bounded the R&D technology using actual US data, we can solve the Social
planner’s problem to determine the optimal R&D intensity (s∗).
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After setting up the Hamiltonian and deriving the ﬁrst order conditions it is easy to see that in
steady state, the social planner devotes a share of output s∗ to R&D investments, and this results
in a growth rate γ∗
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To compute s∗ I just need to calibrate some parameters that I have not quantiﬁed yet. These
are γZ, ς, θ. In this model, Z is exogenous. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that γZ is the same
in the decentralized and in the planned economy. The production function implies that in steady
state, γZ =( 1− α)(γY − n) − ˜ σγA.
ς and θ determine the consumer preferences. The optimal consumption path for the represen-




[r − n − ς] (Euler Equation)
The growth rate of the labor force in the US in the post-war period (n) has been equal to 0.0144
and the growth rate of consumption per capita (γc)h a sb e e n0 .021. Therefore if we calibrate the
discount rate (ς)t o0 .04, the Euler equation implies an inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (θ) between 1 and 2.
Figure 8 plots the resulting optimal R&D intensities for several values of σ and for the λ
0s
that yield a φ in the interval [0,1]. The most striking fact from this ﬁgure is that the optimal
31R&D intensities are not much higher than the actual ones. This ﬁnding is robust to alternative
parameterizations of θ, ς, σ, and of the parameters that determine γA.
Kortum [1993] has estimated λ to be between 0.1 and 0.6. Interestingly, for this range of λ, the
actual R&D intensity roughly coincides with the intensity that the social planner prescribes.















Figure 8: s∗(1 − λ)
This conclusion contrasts with Jones and Williams [2000] who ﬁnd that “the decentralized
economy typically underinvests in R&D relative to what is socially optimal”. The reason for the
divergence in our ﬁndings is that we pursue diﬀerent strategies to quantify γA. While Jones and
Williams impose that all TFP growth must be explained by R&D-driven investments, this paper
a l l o w st h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o nto determine the magnitude of γA.
Having said that, it is important to bear in mind that, in contrast to the conclusions of the pos-
itive exercise, the validity of this normative conclusion depends on the accuracy of the speciﬁcation
of the production function of new intermediate goods (26) and on the calibration of the degree of
aggregate diminishing returns in R&D (λ).
6 Where does this leave us?
Productivity increases because we learn how to use our factors more eﬃciently. This learning may
be a by-product of other activities not directed at increasing the productivity of resources or the
result of investment eﬀorts directed towards the improvement of productivity. In this paper I have
focused in evaluating the contribution to productivity growth of one of these investments, R&D.
32F r o mt h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o ni n t oR & Da n dt h ef a c tt h a tR & Di n n o v a t i o n sa r ee m b o d i e di nt h e
sense of Solow [1959], I have shown that the notion of R&D measured by the NSF is not responsible
for a large share of productivity growth in the US. Since the US is the world leader in R&D, this
conclusion can be made extensive to the other nations.
Our prior was that R&D is the main source of long run growth. The immediate question that
e m e r g e sf r o mt h i sa n a l y s i si s“ t h e n ,w h a ti st h ed r i v i n gf o r c eo fp r od u c t i v i t yg r o w t h ? ” .T h i sq u e s t i o n
should be placed at the top of the research agenda.
I would like to stress that the relatively minor contribution of R&D to productivity growth found
in this analysis does not imply in any way that other purposeful investments (on management, orga-
nization, personnel, ﬁnancial engineering, and many other areas) directed to improve productivity
are not very important. There are indeed two reasons to anticipate an important contribution from
these non-R&D investments. First, the size of the expenditures in these other activities is probably
one order of magnitude larger than R&D expenditures. Second, since the innovations that result
from these investments are disembodied, not patentable and quite easy to imitate, the externalities
associated with them are probably much larger.
From a normative perspective, the analysis conducted in this paper implies that the decentralized
economy may not be underinvesting in R&D.
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36Appendix
In this appendix I extend the baseline model to accommodate dynamic increasing returns into
R&D by allowing ﬁrms to have a subsequent R&D advantage. Then, I use this extension to show
that the R&D contribution to productivity growth is lower when ﬁrms have a subsequent R&D cost
advantage than in the baseline case.
Let’s suppose that an incumbent ﬁrm j with i>0 active innovation clusters has the ability
t od e v e l o pu pt oi new innovation clusters every instant. Let rij denote the amount of R&D
this ﬁrm conducts for each of the i projects. Success at each of the projects arrives with an




c=1), where Ri and Ai denote respectively the total
R&D investments and the total number of varieties available in the market from the ﬁrms with
exactly i − 1 active clusters. The only restrictions I impose on δ are that it is increasing and
concave in rij. Let Ni−1 be the number of ﬁrms with exactly i − 1 active technological clusters.
The framework described so far implies that the total number of clusters developed every instant








One important modiﬁcation introduced with this setup is that the ﬁrm now internalizes part
of the intertemporal consequences of its R&D investments because it is aware that succeeding in
developing the next technological cluster increases the chances of developing new clusters in the
future. However, for simplicity, I still assume that the number of ﬁr m si ne a c hs i z eg r o u p( Ni)
is large and therefore that the eﬀects of rij on Ri, and of Aij on Ai are negligible.26 This means


















(Vi+1 − Vi)=1 , for i>0( 3 1 )






















26This seems to me the most reasonable scenario: one where ﬁrms internalize the cost advantage of subsequent
innovation but do not internalize the aggregate diminishing returns to R&D or the aggregate intertemporal exter-
nalities.
37where the ﬁrst equality comes from the production function for R&D (30), the inequality is a
consequence of the concavity of δ on rij, and the second equality follows from the ﬁrst order
condition (31). Rewriting this, we observe that incumbent R&D ﬁrms make positive proﬁts on





For new R&D ﬁrms, however, free entry brings down the expected value of a ﬁrm with exactly





As before, we can derive the relationship between s and γA by pricing the R&D ﬁrms. The value
of a ﬁrm with exactly i ≥ 1 active clusters satisﬁes the following asset equation:











c=1)(Vi+1 − Vi) − ri





























At this point, we can make a very useful observation. If Vi = iV1, the RHS of this equation is
independent of i. This means that we can ﬁn das o l u t i o nt ot h i ss y s t e mo fd i ﬀerence equations by


































where s1 is the share of R&D conducted by entrants in total output. Since in the steady state γA1,
s1 and A1
A are constant, γV1 = γY − γA.




















where the second inequality takes advantage of the fact that Vi = iV1.























r − γY −

























To relate this expression with the growth rate of varieties when innovators are small (??), recall
that incumbents make positive proﬁts from subsequent R&D. This means that the new term in the
numerator is strictly positive and that instead of an equality, now we have an strict inequality. As
a result, the γA implied by s when we allow ﬁrms to partially internalize the future cost advantages
of their current R&D (i.e. when they are large) is lower than when they are small.
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